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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of cash flow rights 
leverage of controlling shareholder on performance. The ownership of common stock 
has some rights such as control rights and cash flow rights. Control rights are the rights 
of common shareholders to elect board of directors and other company’s policies, such 
as the issuence of securities, stock split and substansial changes in company’s operation 
(Du and Dai, 2005). Cash flow rights are the financial claims of shareholders on the 
companies (La Porta et al., 1999). Case in Indonesia, commonly there are differences 
between control rights and cash flow rights. It  is called cash flow right leverage. The 
large leverage indicates the large agency conflict between controlling shareholder and 
non-controlling shareholders. The low leverage indicates the low agency conflict. It 
will impact on performance. If the control rights are greater than cash flow rights, it 
indicates the larger agency problem. It indicates that the power of the controlling 
shareholder in the company is larger than claim to the firm. It is incentive for a 
controlling shareholder to expropriate non-controlling shareholders through utilizing 
assets of company for his/her private benefit. This study uses the sample of the 
manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the period 
2001-2007. Performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA). The results of this 
study show that the cash flow right leverage of controlling shareholder has negative 
impacts on performance. It means the large agency conflict (cash flow right leverage) 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders reduce performance. The results 
of this study can give contribution for Indonesia Financial Service Authority (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan (OJK)) to monitor public companies in Indonesia. This institution more 
focus for companies which has large cash flow right leverage. Because, it indicates the 
large agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Keywords: controlling shareholder, control rights, cash flow rights, cash flow right 
leverage, agency conflict, and performance. 
 
Abstrak: Tujuan studi ini adalah untuk menginvestigasi dampak dari cash flow right 
leverage pemegang saham pengendali pada kinerja. Pemagang saham biasa mempunyai 
beberapa hak seperti hak kontrol dan hak aliran kas. Hak kontrol adalah hak dari 
pemegang saham biasa untuk memilih dewan direktur dan kebijakan-kebijakan 
perusahaan seperti penerbitan saham, pemecahan saham, dan perubahan-perubahan 
operasi perusahaan (Du dan Dai, 2005). Hal aliran kas adalah klaim keuangan dari para 
pemegang saham terhadap perusahaan (La Porta et al., 1999). Kasus di Indonesia, 
secara umum ada perbedaan antara hak control dan hak aliran kas. Ini sering disebut 
sebagai cash flow right leverage. Besaran leverage ini mengindikasikan besaran konflik 
keagenan antara pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang saham bukan pengendali. 
Semakin kecil leverage ini, hal ini menunjukkan konflik keagenan juga semakin 
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menurun. Leverage ini akan berdampak pada kinerja. Jika hak kontrol lebih besar 
disbanding hak aliran kas, ini mengindikasikan masalah keagenan yang besar. Ini 
menunjukkan bahwa kekuatan atau kendali dari pemegang saham pengendali dalam 
perusahaan lebih besar dibanding klaimnya kepada perusahaan. Ini dapat menjadi 
peluang bagi pemegang saham pengendali untuk mengekspropriasi pemegang saham 
bukan pengendali melalui pemanfaatan aset perusahaan untuk manfaat privat pemagang 
saham pengendali. Studi ini menggunakan sampel perusahaan-perusahaan manufaktur 
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta selama periode 2001-2007. Kinerja diukur dengan 
Return on Assets (ROA). Hasil studi ini menunjukkan bahwa cash flow rigtht leverage 
dari pemegang saham pengendali berdampak negatif pada kinerja. Hasil ini 
menegaskan bahwa konflik keagenan yang besar (cash flow right leverage) antara 
pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang saham bukan pengendali menurunkan 
kinerja. Hasil studi ini dapat memberi kontribusi kepada Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) 
untuk mengawasi perusahaan-perusahaan publik di Indonesia. Lembaga ini dapat lebih 
memfokuskan pada perusahaan-perusahaan yang mempunyai cash flow right leverage 
yang besar. Karena ini mengindikasikan masalah keagenan yang besar antara pemegang 
saham pengendali dan pemegang saham bukan pengendali. 
 
Kata Kunci: pemegang saham pengendali, hak control, hak aliran kas, cash flow right 
leverage, konflik keagegan, dan kinerja. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether the cash flow right leverage of 
controlling shareholder negatively influence on performance. According to Claessens et 
al. (2000), most public companies in Indonesia are owned by single controlling 
stockholder. Controlling shareholder is also the largest control rights of ultimate 
ownership. Febrianto (2005) found that 92% public companies were owned ultimately. 
The finding is consistence with Siregar (2008). Siregar (2008)  documented 99, 09% 
public companies in Indonesia owned ultimately at 10% cut of point of control rights. The 
concentration will generate the separation between cash flow rights and control rights.  
It will reflect entrenchment or alighnment effect. Morck et al. (1988) was the first 
study about entrenchment and alignment. Entrenchment is a situation which control rights 
entrench controlling shareholder to expropriate (abuse of power) non-controlling 
shareholders. Based on Putusan Mahkamah Agung No. 615 K/Pid.Sus/2010 (Mahkamah 
Agung, 2010), it shows an anecdote evidence about PT Bank Century Tbk (BC) giving 
loan (credit) to PT Wibowo Wadah Rejeki (WWR) and PT Accent Investindo Indonesia 
(AII). It shows expropration by controlling shareholder in public company.  
 Based on Putusan Mahkamah Agung  No. 615, Robert Tantular has some  role to this 
case. Based on list of ownership of BC in financial statements, there is no such name as 
Robert Tantular. Based on the information on detikNews (2008) introducing that the 
shareholders of BC on September 30, 2008 is Clearstream Banking S.A. Luxembourg  
11.5%,  First Gulf Asia Holding Limited (d/h Chinkara Capital Limited)  9.55%,  PT 
Century Mega Investindo 9%,  PT Antaboga Delta Sekuritas 7.44%,  PT Century Super 
Investindo 5.64%,  and others less than 5%  is 57,21%. Robert’s name can be found as 
BC’s shareholder by tracing the ultimate ownership. The ultimate ownership of BC is 
Robert Tantular, Hesham Alwarraq, and Rafat Ali Rizfi. Robert owned BC through PT 
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Century Mega Investindo 9%, PT Century Super Investindo 5.64% , and PT Antaboga 
Delta Sekuritas 7.44%. PT Aditya Rekautama had 82.18%  Antaboga’s stock and 
remainder   Antaboga’s stock 17.82% is owned by PT Mitrasejati Makmurabadi. The 
12.5% of  PT Aditya Rekautama’s stock is ownerd by  Robert, Hartawan Aluwi, and Budi 
PV Tanudjaja. Robert and Hartawan are the sons in law of Sukanta Tanudjaja. Sukanta 
Tanjudjaja was owner of  Great  River. Budi is family of Sukanta (VIVAnews-Bisnis, 
2009). 
According to Siregar (2008), pyramid mechanism is popularly used by controlling 
shareholder as 66% (865 from 1.302 observations). There are some controlling 
shareholder on public firms in Indonesia such as family, government, and dispersed 
ownership by financial institution, companies with dispersed ownership, and the other 
controlling shareholder. Family is most dominant as 56% (724 from 1.302 observations). 
The position of controlling shareholder can be known on chain 10 and 11 chain of 
ownerships. It indicates the complexity of the ownership in public firms and also 
controlling shareholder is very hard to be identified.  
The complexity of the ownership will raise entrenchment effect of controlling 
shareholder. According to Fan and Wong (2002), when the controlling shareholder is 
entrenched by his/her control rights and there is  large separation of control rights and cash 
flow rights, reliability of the accounting information is reduced. It occurs  because the 
controlling shareholder controls effectively to firm and he/she also controls the process of 
financial reporting. Therefore, this condition is an incentive for controlling shareholder to 
expropriate firm’s asset to increase his/her private benefit. 
Sanjaya (2011) also documents that family is the greatest controlling shareholder in 
Indonesia at 68.49%. Siregar (2008) also documents that 33.56% of controllong 
shareholders are also the member of board of director. It suggests that directors of public 
companies are the controlling shareholder or the family member of a controlling 
shareholder. Involvement in the board of directors is another way to improve the control 
of ultimate ownership. 
In the next section, theoritical review and hypothesis development will be presented. 
This will be followed with research design. It concludes by presenting the result 
conclusion. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Agency Theory. In the dispersed context, conflict of interest exists between manager and 
shareholders. This is due to the fact that manager has most power to control the company. 
Therefore,  manager does not always act in the best interests of the shareholder because 
manager has also interest for his/her personal benefit. Thus, there is an incentive to 
encourage manager to exploit the company's assets for his/her personal benefit, which may 
become a problem for shareholders.  
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006),  this problem is called Agency Problem I  
or according to Bozec and Laurin (2008), it is Type I Agency Costs. To mitigate the 
problem,  the shareholders make a group of shareholders and become large shareholders to 
monitor manager so that manager will operate the company in accordance to the best 
interest of shareholders. Next, controlling shareholders ask manager to make decisions 
only for their benefit as special dividend. It can be harmful for non-controlling 
shareholders. This is called an agency problem between controlling and non-controlling 
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shareholders or Agency Problem II (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) or Type II Agency Costs 
(Bozec and Laurin, 2008). For concentrated ownership, the company is controlled by the 
controlling shareholder. In reality, corporate manager is a family of controlling 
shareholder. In this situation, the agency problem switches from shareholder and manager 
to controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders. 
Empirical study by La Porta et al. (1999) was monumental study in the context of 
concentrated ownership. La Porta et al. (1999) evaluate the potential agency problem 
between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders when there are 
subtancial defferences between  voting and cash flow rights. Claessens and Fan (2002) 
suggeste  that agency conflicts occur because there is a large divergence  between voting 
and cash flow rights. If the value of cash flow rights is the same as the value of control 
rights, it indicates no agency problem between controlling shareholder and non-controlling 
shareholders.  
The increasing of voting rights leads the controlling shareholder to expropriate the 
company’s assets for his/her private benefits. With the more control, a controlling 
shareholder can exploit the company's assets. It will impact the decreasing of firm 
performance.  According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 759), "as ownership gets beyond a 
certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and prefer to use firms to generate 
private benefits of control. That are  not shared by minority shareholders". This statement 
is the same as  the argument of the negative entrenchment effect. The argument suggests 
that  the controlling shareholder is motivated to fulfil her/his private benefit (Yeh, 2005).  
 
Corporate Governance. According Cadbury Committee (1992), corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing 
the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business 
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject 
to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting. 
 
Controlling shareholder and Performance. Claessens  et  al. (1999)  empirically 
investigate the influence of ownership structure of companies in East Asian on firm 
performance. The study used 2,658 companies including Indonesia on 1996.   They 
document that the increasing of control rights of controlling shareholder has negative 
impact on firm performance. They also test the impact of large divergence between control 
and cash flow rights on firm performance. They find that there is negative impact of 
divergence on firm performance.   
Claessens et al. (2002) investigate the effect of control rights of controlling 
shareholder on the value of the public firm in East Asian. They used 1,301 firms from 
eight countries in East Asian. They found that the large of control rights has negative 
impact on the value of the firm. Lins (2003) investigates the influence of managerial 
ownership and non-manager block holders on the value of the firm in 18 countries. Lins 
(2003) finds that the large control of manager has negative influence on the value of the 
firm.  
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Lemmon and Lins (2003) investigate the impact of public ownerships on the firm 
performance during the financial crisis in East Asian on July 1997.  They collected data 
from Woldscope for 800 companies in East Asian.  Cash flow right leverage is to measure 
the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. The results of their study were 
the divergence of cash flow and control rights has negative impact on firm performance.  
Yang et al. (2012) examine whether efficiency monitoring has a positive influence 
on corporate performance with panel data of listed firms in Taiwan from 2005 to 2010. 
Yang et al. (2012) use holding the percentage of shares by controlling shareholder. The 
percentage of shares is held directly and indirectly by the ultimate ownership.  The 
ultimate is the largest shareholder, the chairperson, or general manager and his/her family, 
or the management team that has the largest influence on operating company. The results 
show the relation between the board-seat control-cash rights divergence and corporate 
performance often reflecting in inverted curve. Corporate performance has the tendency to 
become an inverted curve when the board seat control-voting right divergence exceeds the 
63.5 percent threshold. When the said power exceeds a certain level of board-seat control–
voting rights divergence, large shareholder may harm the interests of non-controlling 
shareholders and reduce corporate performance. Board seat control is percentage of 
director and supervisor seats under the control of the ultimate owner. Shareholding control 
is percentage of shares held directly and indirectly by the ultimate owner.  
Baek et al. (2004) investigate the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance during a crisis in Korean companies. Baek et al. (2004) use set of measures 
for corporate governance before the financial crisis to explain changes in firm 
performance. Controlling shareholder has voting rights exceed his/her cash flow rights. It 
can create severe agency problems between controlling shareholder and non-controlling 
shareholders. For crisis period, Baek et al. (2004) investigate whether divergence between 
cash flow rights and voting rights are associated with lower market value. Baek et al. 
(2004) find that the crisis in Korea has a significant and negative effect on the market 
value of firms. Firms with concentrated ownership by owner-managers and concentrated 
ownership by affiliated firms experience larger drop in firm performance. Firms in which 
the voting rights exceed cash flow rights have significantly lower firm performance. These 
results support the findings of Mitton (2002) that corporate governance has a significant 
influence on firm performance in a crisis. It also suggests that the negative impact is 
greater on firms in which controlling shareholder has stronger incentives to expropriate the 
resources of the firm.  
Joh (2003) examine whether ownership structure has influence on firm performance 
before the crisis. Joh (2003) examine whether shareholder with more control rights than 
ownership rights expropriate firm’s assets before the crisis. A controlling shareholder has 
an incentive to expropriate firm’s assets as his/her private benefits when voting rights 
exceed cash flow rights of controlling shareholder. The expropriation is most likely when 
the divergence between voting and cash flow rights are large. Firms experiencing greater 
expropriation show the lower performance.  Joh  (2003) also examine whether business 
groups have lower firm performance than independent firms. Joh (2003) used 5,829 
Korean firms during the pre-crisis period of 1993-1997. Joh (2003) measures firm 
performance through its profitability. The results show that firm performance is lower 
when cash flow rights of controlling shareholder are lower. Firm performance is low for 
firms when the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights is high.  
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Barontini and Caprio (2004) examined the relation between the firm performance 
and the size of voting and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder for Continental 
European corporations. Barontini and Caprio (2004) test  some hypotheses concerning the 
link between firm performance and ownership in Continental Europe such as firm 
performance grow with the share of the cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholders 
and firm performance decrease as the dissociation between cash-flow and voting rights 
ownership grows. The results show firm performance decrease as the dissociation between 
cash-flow and voting rights ownership grows. Both Tobin’s Q and ROA decrease as the 
wedge between cash flow and voting rights held by the largest shareholder grows. The 
evidence is less clear as far as the relation between performance and cash flow rights is 
concerned.  
Mitton (2002) examines other aspects of corporate governance that vary at the firm 
level. Mitton (2002) examines disclosure quality, ownership structure, and corporate 
diversification which have a significant impact on the performance of firms during the 
crisis. Mitton (2002) uses firm-level data from the five East Asian crisis economies of 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to study the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance during the crisis. Corporate governance is the means by 
which minority shareholders are protected from expropriation by managers or controlling 
shareholder. Corporate governance is more critical in a financial crisis for two reasons. 
First, expropriation of minority shareholders could become more severe during a crisis. 
Second, a crisis could force investors to recognize and take account of weaknesses in 
corporate governance that existed all along. Mitton (2002) finds that corporate governance 
has a significant effect on firm performance during the East Asian crisis. Mitton (2002) 
differentiates between cash flow rights and voting rights of the largest shareholder. Cash 
flow/voting rights divergence increases the incentive for expropriation.  
Bozec and Laurin (2008) investigate the separation of voting and cash flow rights on 
various performances when the large shareholder has the opportunity to expropriate as 
high free cash flows in the firm and the incentive to expropriate as low cash flow rights. 
They use a sample of more than 400 of the largest public Canadian closely-held firms 
from 1995 to 1999. They find the separation between voting and cash-flow rights has 
negative effect on firm performance when the large divergence. It indicates that the 
dominant shareholder gains effective control of the firm has negative impact to the 
company.  
 
The Research Hypothesis. Claessens et al. (1999) find  that the  divergence has negative 
affect to  value of the company.  Lemmon and Lins (2003) find negative impact of 
divergence on value of firm. Baek et al. (2004) find  that the crisis in Korea has negative 
effect on the market value of firms. Bozec and Laurin (2008) find the separation between 
voting and cash-flow rights has negative effect on firm performance when the large 
divergence. Yang et al. (2012) documents inverted curve on the relation of divergence 
between the board-seat controls-voting right and corporate performance.  
There are some negative impacts the increasing cash flow right leverage. In the 
context of concentrated ownership, agency problem can be peroxided by the leverage. If 
the leverage is greater, it indicates a large agency problem. Controlling shareholder has 
more power to control the company than the claim to controlling shareholder to company. 
It means power is larger than claim. This condition encourages controlling shareholder to 
expropriate the company's assets for his/her personal benefit. This is entrenchment effect 
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of controlling shareholder. When the low leverage, it indicates low agency problems 
because cash flow rights is close to or same as the voting rights. In this condition, a 
controlling shareholder does not expropriate the company’s asset because the controlling 
shareholder will not reduce his/her claims for the company. This is the alignment effect of 
the controlling shareholder. 
Based on the conditions, this study expects that the large cash flow right leverage 
leads the controlling shareholder to expropriate the non-controlling shareholders. It will 
reduce the performance. The low leverage indicates less opportunity for controlling 
shareholder to expropriate the non-controlling shareholders. It will positive impact on the 
performance. The study expects that the leverage will have negative impact to the 
performance. To test this expection empirically, this paper formulates hypothesis as 
follow.  
Ha: cash flow right leverage of controlling shareholder has a negative  impact on 
performance. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Sample. Sample of this study is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 2001 to 2007. Sampling was done by purposive sampling because the 
author wants specific information from the target as manufacturing industries listed since 
2001 and publishes the annual financial statements from 2001 to 2007. Data collection 
techniques of this study are the data archive. One form of collection of archived data is 
secondary data. Secondary data obtained from several sources as Indonesian Stock 
Exchange for the audited financial statements, OSIRIS database for ultimate ownership, 
and the Indonesian Business Data Centre for ultimate ownership. 
 
Variable and Measurement. Independent variable of this study is cash flow right 
leverage of controlling shareholder. This variable is measured by cash flow right leverage. 
La Porta et al. (1999) suggest cash flow rights are financial claims against to the company. 
Cash flow rights are  direct and indirect cash flow rights. Direct cash flow rights is the 
percentage of shares which is held by shareholder in public companies behalf of himself. 
Indirect cash flow rights is the number of multiplications shareholders ownership 
percentage in each chain of ownership. Cash flow rights is sum of direct and indirect cash 
flow rights. 
According to La Porta et al. (1999), control is  the voting rights to participate in 
setting corporate policy. Voting rights include the direct voting rights and the indirect 
voting rights. The direct voting rights are the percentage of shares which is held by 
controlling shareholder on behalf of himself at a company. The direct voting rights is 
equal direct cash flow rights. Indirect voting rights is the sum of the minimum control in 
any chain of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999). Control rights is the sum of the relationship 
between the direct control rights and indirect control rights. 
Cash flow rights leverage is control rights minus cash flow rights. The larger 
leverage between cash flow rights and voting rights suggests the higher the increasing  
control rights exceed cash flow rights. Dependent variable is firm performance. The 
performance is measured by return on assets. Accordance to Dechow et al. (1998) and 
Dechow (1994), earnings are information about future cash flow. It is more relevant 
information for investors.  Demsetz and Villalonga (2002) suggest that accounting 
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earnings is better to reflect the effect of concentrated ownership than market value. 
Accounting earnings measures what have and have not been done by manager. Joh (2003) 
also suggests that accounting profitability is likely a better performance measure than 
stock market-based measures. Therefore, this study uses return on assets reflecting the 
firm performance. Return on Asset (ROA) is earnings divided assets. This study uses 
operating earnings. Assets is total assets both current and non-current assets.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Data Description 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Variance 
ROA 
LEVERAGE 
ASSETS 
CFRL 
 
 
Valid N (list wise) 
604 
604 
604 
604 
 
 
-.08 
-.66 
24.22 
.00 
.24 
13.07 
31.78 
.43 
.057 
1.402 
27.296 
.036 
.05665 
1.775 
1.510 
.077 
.003 
3.149 
2.279 
.006 
 
 Based on Table 1, the average value of return on assets (ROA) is 0.057. The 
minimum value of return on assets is -0.08. The value means that there are companies on 
the sample of this study which are negative performance or negative earnings. It means the 
performance of companies on the period (2001-2007) have bad performance. But, the 
maximum of return on assets is 0.24. It means some companies have good performance. 
On the mean value, performance is still positive and it is good performance.  
 The mean value of cash flow right leverage (CFRL) is 0.036 or 3.6%. This condition 
depicts higher voting rights than cash flow rights. It means controlling shareholder has 
more power than financial claim. It is incentive for controlling shareholder to expropriate 
non-controlling shareholders. It will have a negative impact on company. The maximum 
value of cash flow right leverage is 0.43 and minimum is 0. 
 
Hypothesis Testing. This study uses some empirical model to test hypothesis. This study 
uses single regression in model 1. Dependent variable is ROA and CFRL is independent 
variable. In model 2, 3, and 4, this study uses multiple regressions. In model 2, this study 
tests hypothesis with variable assets as controlling variable. In model 3, this study replaces 
assets with leverage as controlling variable. The last model, this study put leverage and 
assets in the empirical model.  The results of the test are as follow on Table 2. 
This table reports regression results of the divergent between voting rights and cash 
flow rights on firm performance. In this table, CFRL is independent variable for the 
divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. Performance is measured by return 
on assets. Return is operating income in accounting earnings. The earnings are on income 
statement. Leverage and Asset are controlling variable. Leverage is liabilities divided in 
equity. Assets are log total asset. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***and ** denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. Test Result Of Hypothesis 
 
Independent 
variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.059 
(23.210)*** 
0.036 
(0.851) 
0.046 
(15.404)*** 
-0.089 
(-2.123)** 
CFRL -0.061 
(-2.037)** 
-0.061 
(-2.039)** 
-0.067 
(-2.355)** 
-0.068 
(-2.420)** 
LEVERAGE   0.009 
(7.784)*** 
0.011 
(8.456)*** 
ASSETS  0.001 
(0.561) 
 0.005 
(3.213)*** 
     
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.097 0.010 
Number of 
observations 
604 604 604 604 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that CFRL which is divergence between control rights 
and cash flow rights. CFRL in Table 2 has negative and significant impact on firm 
performance. The impact of CFRL on firm performance is still consistent in model 2, 3, 
and 4. The results indicate that the large of divergence between control rights and cash 
flow rights has negative impact on firm performance. Increasing of leverage will lead 
decreasing of firm performance. The larger leverage leads the lower firm performance. 
 The results of this study are strongly support for arguments of agency conflict in 
concentrated ownership. The large or low cash flow right leverage or divergence indicates 
large or low agency problem in company. The large leverage indicates large agency 
problem in company. The large agency conflict will impact to the company. Generally, a 
controlling shareholder will put the resources of company for his/her interest not for 
company or non-controlling shareholder.  
 Based on the result in Table 2, alternate hypothesis is supported. This results are 
consistent with the previous study such as Claessens et al. (1999),   Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Baek et  al. (2004),  Bozec and Laurin (2008), and Yang et al. (2012). They find 
that cash flow right leverage has negative impact on firm performance.  
The leverage will entrench controlling shareholder to expropriate non-controlling 
shareholders. A case in Bank of Century Tbk is an expropriation by controlling 
shareholder in Indonesia. Expropriation is occurred because a controlling shareholder has 
lower financial incentives compared with his/her control to the company. This situation 
indicates the agency conflict between controlling shareholder and non-controlling 
shareholders. The controlling shareholder can make decisions exclusively for her/his 
benefit. The larger cash flow right leverage is an incentive and opportunities for 
controlling shareholder to expropriate non- controlling shareholders (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2003).  
The results of this study also support the argument of negative entrenchment effect 
(Yeh, 2005). The larger cash flow right leverage causes higher expropriation. 
Expropriation is conducted by controlling shareholder to increase the private benefit. 
According to Kim and Yi (2006), the leverage is an incentive for controlling shareholder 
to expropriate the company’s assets for private benefit and the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders. It will reduce firm performance. According to Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), 
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the large cash flow right leverage offers incentives and opportunities for controlling 
shareholder to expropriate non-controlling shareholders. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this study are consistent with the objective of this study.  The ultimate 
ownership  negatively influence on firm perfromance. It is reflected on the cash flow right 
leverage between voting rights and control rights which has negative impact on firm 
performance. It indicates the leverage has negative meaning for non-controlling 
shareholders. It implies expropriation by controlling shareholder.  These results reflect 
entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder. This is supported by negative and 
significant impact of cash flow right leverage on firm performance. Consequently, the 
larger leverage will cause the lower firm performance. The lower firm performance is 
negative signal for non-controlling shareholders. It is cost for non-controlling shareholders 
because the firm could not pay dividend. Dividend is one of revenues for investor. 
Hedriksen and Breda (1992; 314) suggest that the efficient operation of an enterprise 
affects both the current dividend stream and the use of the invested capital for providing a 
future dividend stream.  
The results indicate management of firm does not operate firm efficiently. It occurs 
because some management of firm such president director or director is controlling 
shareholder or family of controlling shareholder. The manager will do for his/his family’s 
best interest not for firm or non-controlling shareholders. It is the real cost for outsides 
investor or prospective investors. They must consider the cost into risk management. They 
will attempt to evaluate the efficiency of management before investing or placing a value 
on the stock of the firm (Hendriksen and Breda, 1992; 314). 
The results of this study have some implication. First, the result of this study can be 
input for Indonesia Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK)) for 
moniroting in capital market. This institution can identify the public companies which 
have large or low agency problem indication. It can be known based on cash flow right 
leverage. The large cash flow right leverage indicates control rights is larger than cash 
flow rights. It will be incentive for controlling shareholder to missappropiate firm’s assets. 
Therefore, it harms for non-controlling shareholders. OJK should give protection for non-
controlling shareholders or public. Some researcher have found that it will harms for non-
controlling shareholders such as unpaid dividend, earnings management, tunnelings, and 
etc. OJK should more focus for companies which has large cash flow right leverage than  
low cash flow right leverage. The large cash flow right leverage will raise entrenchment 
effect. The low cash flow right leverage or zero cash flow right leverage will raise 
alignment effect.  
The results of this study can inform to regulator or policy makers to make regulation 
to require public companies to disclose the ultimate ownership. It is very important for 
public or non-controlling shareholders to consider risk of expropriation on their risk 
management. They can reduce risk of expropriation. In the Draft of Capital Market Act 
Republic of Indonesia, it does not require to disclose the ultimate ownership. The 
regulator also lead the public companies to implement good corporate governance to fulfil 
conformance. It focuses on ethical value. It is not only complience to the regulations. The 
results of this study also have implication on practice. Non-controlling shareholders and 
public must be cautious before they make decisions to buy, hold, or sell. 
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The results of this research show the shift of agency problem. In concentrated 
ownership, the agency problem arises between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders commonly. It is not common the agency problem arising between agent and 
principles. It occurs in contex of dispersed ownership. It is important for next researchers 
invistigating agency problem in Indonesia.  
The limitations of this study are without services industries. This study only uses 
manufacturing companies as sample. It will impact on level of generalization. Next 
researchers can combine manufacture and non-manufacture companies in one study to 
wide generalization. Next researchers can improve this research by including 
implementation good corporate governance. Because, it will be good or bad for non-
controlling shareholders. 
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